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Abstract
Game theory provides a mathematical framework for analysing strategic situations involving at least two
players. Normal-form games model situations where the players simultaneously pick their moves. In this
thesis we explore the strategic structure of finite normal-form games.
We look at three notions of isomorphisms between games, the structural properties that they preserve
and under what conditions they are met. We also look at various notions of symmetric games, under what
conditions they are met, the structural properties that these notions capture, how to identify them and how
to construct them.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Game theory provides a mathematical framework for analysing strategic situations involving at least two
players. Since the foundational work of von Neumann and Morgenstern [10] it has found applications in
areas such as artificial intelligence, biology and economics.
A normal-form game models a situation where the players simultaneously pick their strategy from a set
of strategies and each player assigns a utility or payoff value to every possible combination of the strategies.
Most game theory literature is concerned with how a rational player can optimally select their strategy
to maximise their utility, given that each of their opponents is attempting to do the same thing. A lot of
this analysis is concerned with the classification of equilibrium concepts and proving their existence. We
take an excursion away from this pursuit and explore the strategic structure of finite normal-form games.
Analysing the strategic structure of games should be of interest not only to mathematicians but also
people working in other disciplines, for things like determining if a game is fair or under what conditions two
situations arising from seemingly different contexts could be considered to have the same strategic structure.
In Chapter 2 we familiarise the reader with some notation and common mathematical terms which will
be needed throughout the remainder of the thesis. We provide a proof without reference for any results that
may not be common knowledge although we claim no originality to these results.
In Chapter 3 we give a complete definition of a game and a brief introduction to several concepts which
will play a central role to the strategic structure of games we want to analyse.
In Chapter 4 we begin by looking at three notions of isomorphisms between games, the structural
properties that they preserve and under what conditions they are met. In particular we look at the necessary
conditions for the preservation of structure relating to the pure and mixed strategy spaces of two games.
We finish the chapter by defining equivalence between games for each of these notions.
In Chapter 5 we move our focus to symmetric games. We begin by reviewing various notions of a game
being symmetric and introduce classifications which better capture the different possible types of symmetric
structure. We look at the conditions required for these notions to be met, the structural properties that
these notions capture, how to identify them, how to construct them and finally look at two famous theorems
on the existence of equilibria in symmetric games.
2
Chapter 2
Background
We begin by familiarising the reader with some notation and mathematical terms that will be used through-
out the remainder of the thesis. We prove some of the results that may not be common knowledge, but we
claim no originality to them.
2.1 Binary Relations
Definition 2.1.1: A binary relation R between two sets A and B is a subset of A×B. We say that a ∈ A is
related to b ∈ B if (a, b) ∈ R and write aRb. The inverse of a binary relation R is {(b, a) : (a, b) ∈ R} ⊆ B×A
denoted as R−1.
Properties 2.1.2: A binary relation R ⊆ A×B is;
• injective if for all a1, a2 ∈ A and b ∈ B, (a1, b) ∈ R and (a2, b) ∈ R implies a1 = a2,
• functional if for all a ∈ A and b1, b2 ∈ B, (a, b1), (a, b2) ∈ R implies b1 = b2,
• left-total if for all a ∈ A there exists b ∈ B such that (a, b) ∈ R,
• surjective if for all b ∈ B there exists a ∈ A such that (a, b) ∈ R,
• reflexive if B = A and (a, a) ∈ R for all a ∈ A,
• symmetric if B = A and for all a1, a2 ∈ A, (a1, a2) ∈ R implies (a2, a1) ∈ R.
• transitive if B = A and (a1, a2), (a2, a3) ∈ R implies (a1, a3) ∈ R, and
• total if B = A and for all a1, a2 ∈ A, (a1, a2) ∈ R or (a2, a1) ∈ R,
Definition 2.1.3: An equivalence relation on a set A is a reflexive, symmetric and transitive binary relation
∼ ⊆ A × A. The relation ∼ parititons A into equivalence classes [a] where for each a ∈ A, we define
[a] = {a′ ∈ A : a ∼ a′}.
2.2 Functions and Correspondences
Definition 2.2.1: Let X and Y be non-empty sets. A function from X to Y is a functional left-total binary
relation f ⊆ X × Y , which we denote as f : X → Y . We denote the set of functions from X to Y as Y X .
Let f : X → Y be a function. Since f is functional, for each x ∈ X we can denote by f(x) the unique
element in Y such that (x, f(x)) ∈ f . The image of f is the set {f(x) : x ∈ X} which we denote as Im(f).
If Y = X then the function that maps each element of X to itself acts as an identity under composition, we
call this the identity function and denote it as idX : X → X.
Definition 2.2.2: A bijection is an injective and surjective function. Bijections form a group under com-
position.
Definition 2.2.3: A function f : R→ R is strictly increasing if for each x, y ∈ R we have x < y if and only
if f(x) < f(y).
Proposition 2.2.4: Surjective strictly increasing functions form a group under composition.
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Proof. The identity function idR is a surjective increasing function giving the existence of an identity.
Let f, g : R→ R be surjective increasing functions.
If x, y ∈ R such that f(x) = f(y) then we must have x = y, making f injective. Therefore f−1 exists
and is also a bijection.
For each x, y ∈ R we have x < y if and only if f(x) < f(y), which gives f−1(x) < f−1(y) if and only if
x < y. Therefore f−1 is also a surjective increasing function.
Now g ◦ f is surjective and for each x, y ∈ R we have x < y if and only if f(x) < f(y) and f(x) < f(y)
if and only if g(f(x)) < g(f(y)). Therefore x < y if and only if (g ◦ f)(x) < (g ◦ f)(y) making g ◦ f strictly
increasing.
Definition 2.2.5: A positive linear transformation is a function f : R → R where for some α ∈ R+ and
β ∈ R, f(x) = αx+ β for all x ∈ R.
Proposition 2.2.6: Positive linear transformations form a subgroup of the surjective strictly increasing
functions under composition.
Proof. A positive linear transformation is differentiable and its derivative is positive making it a strictly
increasing function.
The identity function which maps real numbers to themselves is a positive linear transformation giving
the existence of an identity.
Let α, γ ∈ R+, β, δ ∈ R and f, g : R → R be positive linear transformations where for each x ∈ R we
have f(x) = αx+ β and g(x) = γx+ δ.
For each x ∈ R we have f−1(x) = x−βα = 1αx− βα and (g ◦ f)(x) = γ(αx+β) + δ = αγx+ (βγ+ δ) which
are both positive linear transformations.
Definition 2.2.7: A correspondence between two sets X and Y is a left-total binary relation c ⊆ X×Y . For
simplicity, we can treat a correspondence c ⊆ X×Y as a function c : X → P(Y )∗ where P(Y )∗ = P(Y )−{∅}
and for each x ∈ X we have c(x) = {y ∈ Y : (x, y) ∈ c}.
Definition 2.2.8: A fixed point of a correspondence c : X → P(Y )∗ is an element x ∈ X such that x ∈ c(x).
We now state Kakutani’s [6] fixed point theorem without proof which will be referred to when sketching
out how to prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the Chapter 3.
Theorem 2.2.9: If X is a non-empty, compact and convex subset of Rd and c : X → P(X)∗ is a corre-
spondence on X with a closed graph and the property that c(x) is convex for all x ∈ X. Then there exists
a fixed point x ∈ X such that x ∈ c(x).
2.3 Preference Relations
It is common in economics to require an agent to assign preferences to a set of alternatives A which are
captured with the notion of a preference relation.
Definition 2.3.1: A preference relation or total preorder for an agent over a set A is a reflexive, transitive
and total binary relation -⊆ A× A. If (a1, a2) ∈- we write a1 - a2 and say that a2 is weakly preferred to
or at least as good as a1.
Definition 2.3.2: Two preference relations -1⊆ A × A and -2⊆ B × B are isomorphic if there exists a
bijection f : A→ B such that a1 -1 a2 if and only if f(a1) -2 f(a2).
2.4 Relations and Matchings
Let N and {Ai : i ∈ N} be non-empty sets. To simplify notation for each i ∈ N we denote A−i
as the set ×j∈N−{i}Aj , and for ai ∈ Ai and a−i = (a1, ..., ai−1, ai+1, ...) ∈ A−i we denote (ai, a−i) as
(a1, ..., ai−i, ai, ai+1, ...) ∈ ×i∈NAi.
Definition 2.4.1: Let N and {Ai : i ∈ N} be non-empty sets. A relation R on {Ai : i ∈ N} is a subset of
×i∈NAi.
Properties 2.4.2: A relation R ⊆ ×i∈NAi is;
• i− unique if for all ai ∈ Ai and a−i, a′−i ∈ A−i, (ai, a−i), (ai, a′−i) ∈ R implies a−i = a′−i.
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• i− total if for all ai ∈ Ai there exists a−i ∈ A−i such that (ai, a−i) ∈ R.
Definition 2.4.3: A matching M of n ≥ 2 sets A1, ..., An is a relation which is i-total and i-unique for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n.
A matching of A1, ..., An requires |A1| = ... = |An| and takes the form:
{(a1, ..., an) : each ai appears in exactly one n-tuple}.
For 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n a matching M induces a unique bijection Mij : Ai → Aj which maps elements ai ∈ Ai
to the unique element aj ∈ Aj such that ai and aj are elements of an n-tuple in M . Mii is the identity
bijection for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and Mkl ◦ (Mjk ◦Mij) = (Mkl ◦Mjk) ◦Mij for all 1 ≤ i, j, k, l ≤ n.
2.5 Groupoids
Definition 2.5.1: A groupoid consists of
1. A non-empty set of objects C, and
2. For each pair of objects X,Y ∈ C a set of bijective morphisms from X to Y denoted as C(X,Y ).
Satisfying
• For every object X ∈ C there exists an element idX ∈ C(X,X),
• For every triple of objects X,Y, Z ∈ C there exists a composite function ◦ : C(Y,Z) × C(X,Y ) →
C(X,Z), and
• For every pair of objects X,Y ∈ C there exists an inverse function inv : C(X,Y )→ C(Y,X).
Also satsifying the additional properties that for each W,X, Y,X ∈ C and f ∈ bij(W,X), g ∈ bij(X,Y ),
and h ∈ bij(Y,Z)
• f ◦ idW = f = idX ◦f ,
• h ◦ (g ◦ f) = (h ◦ g) ◦ f , and
• f ◦ inv f = idY and inv f ◦ f = idX .
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Chapter 3
Normal-Form Games
A normal-form game represents a situation where at least two players simultaneously select a strategy from
a set of possible strategies. A combination of players’ strategies is called a pure strategy profile, and each
player has a utility or payoff value specified for every possible pure strategy profile.
We assume that all games have common knowledge, which is to say that each player knows not only
their own strategies and payoffs, but also those of their opponents, knows that each of their opponents know
this, ad infinitum. Each player aims to pick their strategy, possibly randomly, to maximise their utility,
knowing that each of their opponents are doing the same.
In this chapter we formally define what a normal-form game is and give a brief overview of several
concepts which will play a central role in our analysis for the following chapters. For a more thorough
coverage of this material see Myerson [7].
3.1 Definition of a Game
Definition 3.1.1: A normal-form game consists of a set N of at least two players, where each player i ∈ N
has a non-empty set Ai of strategies and a utility or payoff function ui : A → R where A = ×i∈NAi is the
pure strategy space of the game. Elements of A are typically referred to as pure strategy profiles. We denote
such a game as the triple Γ = (N,A, u).
A normal-form game is finite if the player and strategy sets are finite, since we only concern ourselves
with finite normal-form games we simply refer to them as games. For each i ∈ N we denote their number
of strategies |Ai| as di.
Proposition 3.1.2: For each player i ∈ N , their utility function induces a preference relation -i over the
pure strategy space where s -i s′ if and only if ui(s) ≤ ui(s′) for all s, s′ ∈ A.
Proof. This follows from ≤ being reflexive, transitive and total on R.
Although players must select a single strategy when playing a game, they are able to select their strategy
using a random process, we call such a strategy a mixed strategy.
Definition 3.1.3: The mixed strategy space ∆(Ai) for player i is the set {σi ∈ [0, 1]Ai :
∑
si∈Ai σi(si) = 1}
of probability distributions over Ai. The mixed strategy space ∆(A) for Γ is the Cartesian product of the
players’ mixed strategy spaces ×i∈N∆(Ai). Elements of ∆(A) are typically referred to as mixed strategy
profiles. For a mixed strategy profile σ = (σi)i∈N ∈ ∆(A) and pure strategy s = (si)i∈N ∈ A we denote σ(s)
as the product
∏
i∈N σi(si).
Proposition 3.1.4: The mixed strategy space is a convex subset of Rd1...dn .
Proof. Let σ, σ′ ∈ ∆(A) and p ∈ [0, 1]. Then
• (p.σi + (1− p).σ′i)(si) = p.σi(si) + (1− p).σ′i(si) ∈ [0, 1] for all i ∈ N and si ∈ Ai, and
• ∑si∈Ai(p.σi + (1− p).σ′i)(si) = p.∑si∈Ai σi(si) + (1− p).∑si∈Ai σ′i(si) = 1 for all i ∈ N .
Therefore p.σ + (1− p).σ′ ∈ ∆(A).
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While we cannot give a definite utility value to a player for a given mixed strategy profile, we can
introduce a notion of expected utility by linearly extending the domain of each player’s utility function to
the mixed strategy space as follows.
Definition 3.1.5: The expected utility function for player i ∈ N is the function u˜i : ∆(A) → R where
u˜i(σ) =
∑
s∈A σ(s)ui(s) for all σ ∈ ∆(A).
Proposition 3.1.6: For each player i ∈ N , their expected utility function induces a preference relation -i
over the mixed strategy space where σ -i σ′ if and only if u˜i(σ) ≤ u˜i(σ′) for all σ, σ′ ∈ ∆(A).
Proof. This follows from ≤ being reflexive, transitive and total on R.
Definition 3.1.7: Let σ, σ′, σ′′ ∈ ∆(A). For each player i ∈ N , their expected utility function is;
• Continuous if u˜i(σ) ≤ u˜i(σ′) ≤ u˜i(σ′′) implies the existance of p ∈ [0, 1] such that u˜i(p.σ+(1−p)σ′′) =
u˜i(σ
′), and
• Independent if u˜i(σ) ≤ u˜i(σ′) implies u˜i(p.σ + (1− p).σ′′) ≤ u˜i(p.σ′ + (1− p).σ′′) for all p ∈ [0, 1].
Proposition 3.1.8: For each player i ∈ N , their utility function is continuous and independent.
Proof. Suppose u˜i(σ) ≤ u˜i(σ′) ≤ u˜i(σ′′). If u˜i(σ) = u˜i(σ′′) then our continuity condition is satisfied for all
p ∈ [0, 1]. Now suppose u˜i(σ) 6= u˜i(σ′′). Then for continuity we need p ∈ [0, 1] such that,
u˜i(p.σ + (1− p).σ′′) = p.u˜i(σ) + (1− p).u˜i(σ′′) = u˜i(σ)
Since this is satisfied for p = u˜i(σ
′)−u˜i(σ′′)
u˜i(σ)−u˜i(σ′′) ∈ [0, 1], u˜i is continuous.
Now suppose u˜i(σ) ≤ u˜i(σ′). Then for each p ∈ [0, 1] we have u˜i(p.σ + (1 − p).σ′′) = pu˜i(σ) + (1 −
p).u˜i(σ
′′) ≤ pu˜i(σ′) + (1− p).u˜i(σ′′) = u˜i(p.σ′ + (1− p).σ′′).
Therefore u˜i is independent.
Totality, transitivity, continuity and independence are the assumptions von Neumann and Morgenstern
[10] require for players’ preferences over simple lotteries in order for such an expected utility function to
exist in their famous expected utility theorem.
3.2 Table Representation of a Game
It can be convenient to represent each player’s utility values in a single n-dimensional table, where each
dimension corresponds to the strategy choices of one of the players, and each element of of the table
corresponds to a unique pure strategy profile, which contains the utility values for each of the players. To
make this clearer we give a couple of examples below.
Example 3.2.1: Below is the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma game, the row and columns correspond to the
strategies of players 1 and 2 respectively.
d c
d 2, 2 1, 4
c 4, 1 3, 3
A1 = A2 = {d, c}, A = {(d, d), (d, c), (c, d), (c, c)}
Let s = (d, c) ∈ A and σ = ((0.2, 0.8), (0.5, 0.5)) ∈ ∆(A), then u2(s) = 4 and
u˜2(σ) = (0.2)(0.5)2 + (0.2)(0.5)4 + (0.8)(0.5)1 + (0.8)(0.5)3 = 2.2
Example 3.2.2: Below is a 2× 2× 2 game where each matrix corresponds to one of player 3’s strategies,
and the row and columns correspond to the strategies of players 1 and 2 respectively.
b1 b2
a1 1, 1, 1 2, 3, 2
a2 3, 2, 2 4, 4, 5
c1
b1 b2
a1 2, 2, 3 5, 4, 4
a2 4, 5, 4 6, 6, 6
c2
A1 = {a1, a2}, A2 = {b1, b2}, A3 = {c1, c2}
Let s = (a2, b1, c2) ∈ A, then u2(s) = 5.
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3.3 Dominant Strategies
While there is no obvious way for players to give a preference ordering of their strategy set, we can introduce
a weaker ordering notion with the idea of a player’s strategy dominating another one.
Definition 3.3.1: Let si, s
′
i ∈ Ai. si strictly dominates s′i if ui(si, s−i) > ui(s′i, s−i) for all s−i ∈ A−i, which
we denote as si i s′i.
Definition 3.3.2: Let si ∈ Ai and σi ∈ ∆(Ai). σi strictly dominates si if ui(σi, σ−i) > ui(si, σ−i) for all
σ−i ∈ ∆(A−i), which we denote as σi i si.
3.4 Best Response Correspondences
A strategy si ∈ Ai for player i ∈ N is a pure best response to s−i ∈ A−i if ui(si, s−i) ≥ ui(s′i, s−i) for all
s′i ∈ Ai. For each player i and each strategy s−i ∈ A−i, player i ∈ N has a non-empty set of best responses.
Definition 3.4.1: Player i’s pure best response correspondence is the correspondence bi : A−i → P(Ai)∗
where bi(s−i) = arg maxsi∈Ai ui(si, s−i) for all s−i ∈ A−i. The game’s pure best response correspondence is
the correspondence bΓ : A→ P(A)∗ where b(s) = {s′ ∈ A : s′i ∈ bi(s−i)∀i ∈ N} for all s ∈ A.
A mixed strategy σi ∈ ∆(Ai) for player i ∈ N is a best response to σ−i ∈ ∆(A−i) if u˜i(σi, σ−i) ≥
u˜i(σ
′
i, σ−i) for all σ
′
i ∈ ∆(Ai). For each player i and each strategy σ−i ∈ ∆(A−i), player i ∈ N has a
non-empty set of best responses.
Definition 3.4.2: Player i’s best response correspondence is the correspondence b˜i : ∆(A−i)→ P(∆(Ai))∗
where for each σ−i ∈ ∆(A−i), b˜i(σ−i) = arg maxσi∈∆(Ai) u˜i(σi, σ−i). The game’s best response correspondence
is the correspondence b˜ : ∆(A)→ P(∆(A))∗ where for each σ ∈ ∆(A), b˜(σ) = {σ′ ∈ ∆(A) : σ′i ∈ b˜i(σ−i) ∀ i ∈
N}.
3.5 Nash Equilibria
The most central equilibrium concept in game theory is that of Nash equilibria. They represent strategy
profiles where no player can deviate from their specified strategy to increase their payoff, given the strategies
being played by their opponents.
Definition 3.5.1: A strategy profile s ∈ A is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if for each player i, there
does not exist an alternative strategy s′i ∈ Ai such that ui(s′i, s−i) > ui(si, s−i).
Definition 3.5.2: A strategy profile σ ∈ ∆(A) is a Nash equilibrium if for each player i ∈ N , there does
not exist an alternative strategy σ′i ∈ ∆(Ai) such that u˜i(σ′i, σ−i) > u˜i(σi, σ−i).
It is fairly straightforward to see that a mixed strategy profile σ ∈ ∆(A) is a Nash equilibrium if and
only if it is a fixed point of the best response correspondence b˜.
We now state Nash’s [8] famous theorem without proof which gives the eixstence of a Nash equilibria.
Theorem 3.5.3: Every game has a Nash equilibrium.
One way to prove this is to show that the mixed strategy space of the game is a non-empty, compact
and convex subset of Rd1...dn , that b˜ has a closed graph and that b˜(σ) is convex for all σ ∈ ∆(A). Existence
then follows from Kakutani’s fixed point theorem.
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Chapter 4
Equivalence of Games
It is often useful to know whether or not two games are strategically equivalent, for example to determine
when two seemingly different situations have the same strategic structure or if a game is symmetric under
any notion of the word.
4.1 Game Bijections
We use the definition of a game bijection given by Gabarr et al. [3].
Definition 4.1.1: Let Γ1 = (N,A, u) and Γ2 = (M,B, v) be two games. A bijection between Γ1 and Γ2
consists of a bijection pi : N →M and for each player i ∈ N , a bijection τi : Ai → Bpi(i). We denote the set
of all bijections between Γ1 and Γ2 as bij(Γ1,Γ2).
For g = (pi; (τi)i∈N ) ∈ bij(Γ1,Γ2), i ∈ N , si ∈ Ai and s ∈ A we use similar notation to that introduced
by Stein et al. [9] for symmetric games by denoting g.i as pi(i) ∈ M , g.si as τi(si) ∈ Bpi(i), and g.s as
(τpi−1(j)(spi−1(j)))j∈M ∈ B giving (g.s)g.i = τi(si).
Definition 4.1.2: For g = (pi; (τi)i∈N ) ∈ bij(Γ1,Γ2) and h = (η; (φj)j∈M ) ∈ bij(Γ2,Γ3), their composite,
denoted h ◦ g, is (η ◦ pi; (φpi(i) ◦ τi)i∈N ) ∈ bij(Γ1,Γ3) giving (h ◦ g).s = h.(g.s) for each s ∈ A, and the inverse
of g, denoted g−1, is (pi−1; (τ−1
pi−1(j))j∈M ) ∈ bij(Γ2,Γ1).
Furthermore, each g ∈ bij(Γ1,Γ2) induces vg.i ◦ g ∈ RAi where (vg.i ◦ g)(s) = vg.i(g.s) for all s ∈ A, and
each g ∈ bij(Γ1,Γ2) and σ ∈ ∆(A) induces σ ◦ g−1 ∈ ∆(B) where (σ ◦ g−1)(t) = σ(g−1.t) for each t ∈ B,
giving us (σ ◦ g−1)(g.s) = σ(s). When convenient we denote σ ◦ g−1 as g.σ.
Proposition 4.1.3: Games and game bijections are a groupoid.
Proof. Let Γ1 = (N,A, u), Γ2 = (M,B, v) and f = (pi; (τi)i∈N ) ∈ bij(Γ1,Γ2). Then,
f ◦ idΓ1 = (pi; (τi)i∈N ) ◦ (idN ; (idAi)i∈N )
= (pi ◦ idN ; (τi ◦ idAi)i∈N )
= (pi; (τi)i∈N ) = f,
idΓ2 ◦ f = (idM ; (idBj )j∈M ) ◦ (pi; (τi)i∈N )
= (idM ◦ pi; (idBpi(i) ◦ τi)i∈N )
= (pi; (τi)i∈N ) = f,
f ◦ f−1 = (pi; (τi)i∈N ) ◦ (pi−1; (τ−1pi−1(j))j∈M )
= (pi ◦ pi−1; (τpi−1(j) ◦ τ−1pi−1(j))j∈M )
= (idM , (idBj )j∈M ) = idΓ2 , and
f−1 ◦ f = (pi−1; (τ−1
pi−1(j))j∈M ) ◦ (pi; (τi)i∈N )
= (pi−1 ◦ pi; (τ−1
pi−1(pi(i)) ◦ τi)i∈N )
= (idN , (idAi)i∈N ) = idΓ1 .
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Now let Γ3 = (P,C,w), Γ4 = (Q,D, x), g = (η; (φj)j∈M ) ∈ bij(Γ2,Γ3), and h = (ξ; (λk)k∈P ) ∈ bij(Γ3,Γ4).
Then,
h ◦ (g ◦ f) = (ξ; (λk)k∈P ) ◦ ((η; (φj)j∈M ) ◦ (pi; (τi)i∈N ))
= (ξ; (λk)k∈P ) ◦ (η ◦ pi; (φpi(i) ◦ τi)i∈N )
= (ξ ◦ (η ◦ pi); (λ(η◦pi)(i) ◦ (φpi(i) ◦ τi))i∈N )
= (ξ ◦ η ◦ pi; (λ(η◦pi)(i) ◦ φpi(i) ◦ τi)i∈N ), and
(h ◦ g) ◦ f = ((ξ; (λk)k∈P ) ◦ (η; (φj)j∈M )) ◦ (pi; (τi)i∈N )
= (ξ ◦ η; (λη(j) ◦ φj)j∈M ) ◦ (pi; (τi)i∈N )
= ((ξ ◦ η) ◦ pi; ((λη(pi(i)) ◦ φpi(i)) ◦ τi)i∈N )
= (ξ ◦ η ◦ pi; (λ(η◦pi)(i) ◦ φpi(i) ◦ τi)i∈N ).
4.2 Game Isomorphisms
To distinguish whether or not two games have the same structure we need the concept of structure preserving
game bijections, called game isomorphisms. A number of possible isomorphisms are possible, depending on
how much structure we want preserved.
We begin with the simplest notion of a game isomorphism which was introduced by Nash [8], it requires
the preservation of players’ utility values.
Definition 4.2.1: A bijection g ∈ bij(Γ1,Γ2) is a strict game isomorphism if ui = vg.i ◦ g for all i ∈ N . We
denote the set of strict game isomorphisms between Γ1 and Γ2 as isom(Γ1,Γ2).
Example 4.2.2: Two games with the same strategic structure.
b1 b2
a1 1, 8 2, 7
a2 3, 6 4, 5
d1 d2
c1 6, 3 8, 1
c2 5, 4 7, 2
Let pi =
(
1 2
2 1
)
, τ1 =
( a1 a2
d2 d1
)
, and τ2 =
(
b1 b2
c1 c2
)
, then g = (pi; τ1, τ2) is a strict game isomorphism. For
example
u1(a1, b2) = vpi(1)(τ2(b2), τ1(a1)) = v2(c2, d2).
Our second type of game isomorphism (see Gabarro et al. [3]) requires the preservation of players’
preferences over the the pure strategy spaces.
Definition 4.2.3: A bijection g ∈ bij(Γ1,Γ2) is an ordinal game isomorphism if for each i ∈ N we have
ui(s) ≤ ui(s′) if and only if vg.i(g.s) ≤ vg.i(g.s′) for all s, s′ ∈ A. We denote the set of ordinal game
isomorphisms between Γ1 and Γ2 as isomo(Γ1,Γ2).
Our third type of game isomorphism (see Harsanyi and Selten [5]) requires the preservation of players’
preferences over the mixed strategy spaces.
Definition 4.2.4: A bijection g ∈ bij(Γ1,Γ2) is a cardinal game isomorphism if for each i ∈ N we have
u˜i(σ) ≤ u˜i(σ′) if and only if v˜g.i(g.σ) ≤ v˜g.i(g.σ′) for all σ, σ′ ∈ ∆(A). We denote the set of cardinal game
isomorphisms as isomc(Γ1,Γ2).
4.3 Properties of Game Isomorphisms
Proposition 4.3.1: Games and strict, ordinal or cardinal game isomorphisms are a groupoid.
Proof. We just prove this for ordinal game isomorphisms as the other proofs are similar.
If g ∈ isomo(Γ1,Γ2) then we have ui(s) ≤ ui(s′) if and only if vg.i(g.s) ≤ vg.i(g.s′), which is equivalent
to ug−1.j(g
−1.t) ≤ ug−1.j(g−1.t′) if and only if vj(t) ≤ vj(t′). Therefore g−1 ∈ isomo(Γ2,Γ1).
Let Γ1 = (N,A, u), Γ2 = (M,B, v) and Γ3 = (P,C,w) such that there exists g ∈ isomo(Γ1,Γ2) and
h ∈ isomo(Γ2,Γ3).
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Then for each i ∈ N and s, s′ ∈ A we have, ui(s) ≤ ui(s′) if and only if vg.i(g.s) ≤ vg.i(g.s′), and
vg.i(g.s) ≤ vg.i(g.s′) if and only if wh.(g.i)(h.(g.s)) ≤ wh.(g.i)(h.(g.s′)).
Therefore ui(s) ≤ ui(s′) if and only if w(h◦g).i((h◦g).s) ≤ w(h◦g).i((h◦g).s′), giving h◦g ∈ isomo(Γ1,Γ3).
Our other conditions follow from games and game bijections being a groupoid.
Proposition 4.3.2: g ∈ bij(Γ1,Γ2) is an ordinal game isomorphism if and only if for each player i ∈ N
there exists a surjective strictly increasing function αi ∈ RR such that αi ◦ ui = vg.i ◦ g.
Proof. Suppose there exists g ∈ bij(Γ1,Γ2) and a surjective strictly increasing function αi ∈ RR such that
αi ◦ ui = vg.i ◦ g. Then for each i ∈ N and s, s′ ∈ A such that ui(s) ≤ ui(s′) we have,
(α ◦ ui)(s) = vg.i(g.s) ≤ vg.i(g.s′) = (α ◦ ui)(s′).
Similarly, for each j ∈M and t, t′ ∈ B such that vj(t) ≤ vj(t′), we have,
(α−1 ◦ vj)(t) = ug−1.j(g−1.t) ≤ ug−1.j(g−1.t′) = (α−1 ◦ vj)(t′).
Conversely, suppose there exists g ∈ isomo(Γ1,Γ2).
Let i ∈ N and A¯0 = arg mins∈A ui(s).
For each l ∈ Z+ let A¯l = arg mins∈A−∪l−1j=1A¯j ui(s).
Let k ∈ N such that A¯k is non-empty and A¯k+1 is empty.
Let s0 ∈ A¯0, ..., and sk ∈ A¯k.
Let µ0 = ui(s0), ..., µk = ui(sk), ν0 = vg.i(g.s0), ..., and νk = vg.i(g.sk).
Define αi ∈ RR by
αi(x) =

ν0
µ0
x if −∞ < x ≤ µ0
ν1−ν0
µ1−µ0x+
µ1ν0−ν1µ0
µ1−µ0 if µ0 < x ≤ µ1
...
νk−νk−1
µk−µk−1x+
µkνk−1−νkµk−1
µk−µk−1 if µk−1 < x ≤ µk
νk
µk
x if µk < x <∞
Then α is a surjective strictly increasing function with αi ◦ ui = vg.i ◦ g.
This shows that the players’ preferences over the pure strategy spaces are preserved uniquely up to
surjective strictly increasing functions.
We now prove some of the additional properties relating to the pure strategy spaces which are preserved.
Proposition 4.3.3: If g ∈ isomo(Γ1,Γ2) then by 4.3.2 for each i ∈ N there exists a surjective strictly
increasing function αi ∈ RR such that αi ◦ ui = vg.i ◦ g, and g preserves;
1. The player’s pure best response correspondences.
2. The game’s pure best response correspondence.
3. The pure strategy Nash equilibria.
4. Dominance of pure strategies over pure strategies.
Proof. 1. Let i ∈ N , s−i ∈ A−i and si ∈ bi(s−i) so that ui(si, s−i) ≤ ui(s′i, s−i) for all s′i ∈ Ai. Then for
each s′i ∈ Ai we have,
(αi ◦ ui)(si, s−i) = vg.i(g.(si, s−i)) ≤ vg.i(g.(s′i, s−i)) = (αi ◦ ui)(s′i, s−i).
Therefore g.si ∈ bg.i(g.s−i).
The reverse argument is the same.
2. Let s′ ∈ A and s ∈ b(s′) so that si ∈ bi(s′−i) for all i ∈ N . Then g.si ∈ bg.i(g.s′−i) for all i ∈ N .
Therefore g.s ∈ b(g.s′).
The reverse argument is the same.
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3. Let s ∈ A be a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Then s ∈ b(s) giving us g.s ∈ b(g.s), making g.s a
pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
The reverse argument is the same.
4. Let i ∈ N and si, s′i ∈ Ai such that ui(si, s−i) ≥ ui(s′i, s−i) for all s−i ∈ A−i. Then vg.i(g.(si, s−i)) ≥
vg.i(g.(s
′
i, s−i)) for all s−i ∈ A−i. Therefore g.si strictly dominates g.s′i.
The reverse argument is the same.
Note that the proofs for Propositions 4.3.4 and 4.3.5 were communicated to the author via email by
Noah Stein.
Proposition 4.3.4: Let Γ1 = (N,A, u), Γ2 = (M,B, v), i ∈ N and g ∈ bij(Γ1,Γ2). If there exists a positive
linear transformation αi ∈ RR such that αi ◦ ui = vg.i ◦ g, then αi ◦ u˜i = v˜g.i ◦ g.
Proof. Since αi is a positive linear transformation, there exists βi ∈ R+ and γi ∈ R such that for each s ∈ A
we have βi.ui(s) + γi = vg.i(g.s). Therefore for each σ ∈ ∆(A) we have,
(v˜g.i ◦ g)(σ) = v˜g.i(σ ◦ g−1) =
∑
t∈B
σ ◦ g−1(t).vg.i(t)
=
∑
s∈A
σ ◦ g−1(g.s).vg.i(g.s)
=
∑
s∈A
σ(s).vg.i(g.s)
=
∑
s∈A
σ(s).(βi.ui(s) + γi)
= βi
∑
s∈A
(σ(s).ui(s)) + γi
∑
s∈A
σ(s)
= βi.u˜i(σ) + γi = (αi ◦ u˜i)(σ)
Proposition 4.3.5: g ∈ bij(Γ1,Γ2) is a cardinal game isomorphism if and only if for each player i ∈ N
there exists a positive linear transformation αi : R→ R such that αi ◦ ui = vg.i ◦ g.
Proof. Suppose for each player i ∈ N there exists a positive linear transformation αi ∈ RR such that
αi ◦ ui = vg.i ◦ g. Then for each i ∈ N and σ, σ′ ∈ ∆(A) such that u˜i(σ) ≤ u˜i(σ′) we have,
v˜g.i(σ ◦ g−1) = (α ◦ u˜i)(σ) ≤ (α ◦ u˜i)(σ′) = v˜g.i(σ′ ◦ g−1).
Similarly, for each j ∈M and ς, ς ′ ∈ B such that v˜j(ς) ≤ v˜j(ς ′), we have,
(α−1 ◦ v˜j)(ς) = u˜g−1.j(ς ◦ g) ≤ u˜g−1.j(ς ′ ◦ g) = (α−1 ◦ vj)(ς ′).
Conversely, suppose g ∈ isomc(Γ1,Γ2) and let i ∈ N , s = arg mins∈A ui(s), s¯ = arg maxs∈A ui(s).
Let u = ui(s), u¯ = ui(s¯), v = vg.i(g.s), and v¯ = vg.i(g.s¯).
Define αi ∈ RR by
αi(x) =

x if u = u¯ = 0
v¯
u¯x if u = u¯ 6= 0
v¯−v
u¯−ux+
u¯v−v¯u
u¯−u if u 6= u¯
for all x ∈ R
Then αi is a positive linear transformation with (αi ◦ ui)(s) = vg.i(g.s) and (αi ◦ ui)(s¯) = vg.i(g.s¯).
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Now let s ∈ A. Since ui(s) ≤ ui(s) ≤ ui(s¯) and u˜i is continuous, there exists σ ∈ ∆(A) such that
σ(s′) = 0 for all s′ ∈ A− {s, s¯} and ui(s) = u˜i(σ). Therefore,
(αi ◦ ui)(s) = (αi ◦ u˜i)(σ)
= σ(s)(αi ◦ ui)(s) + σ(s¯)(αi ◦ ui)(s¯)
= σ(s)vg.i(g.s) + σ(s¯)vg.i(g.s¯)
= v˜g.i(σ ◦ g−1)
= vg.i(g.s)
This shows that the players’ preferences over the mixed strategy spaces are preserved uniquely up to
positive linear transformations of their utility functions.
We now prove some of the additional properties relating to the mixed strategy spaces which are preserved.
Proposition 4.3.6: If g ∈ isomc(Γ1,Γ2) then by 4.3.5 for each player i ∈ N there exists βi ∈ R+ and γi ∈ R
such that βi.u˜i(σ) + γi = v˜g.i(σ ◦ g−1) for all σ ∈ ∆(A), and g preserves;
1. The player’s best response correspondences.
2. The game’s best response correspondence.
3. The mixed strategy Nash equilibria.
4. Dominance of mixed strategies over pure strategies.
Proof. 1. Let i ∈ N , σ−i ∈ ∆(A−i) and σi ∈ b˜i(σ−i) so that u˜i(σi, σ−i) ≥ u˜i(σ′i, σ−i) for all σ′i ∈ ∆(Ai).
Then v˜g.i((σi, σ−i) ◦ g−1) ≥ v˜g.i((σ′i, σ−i) ◦ g−1) for all σ′i ∈ ∆(Ai). Therefore σi ◦ g−1 ∈ b˜g.i(σ−i ◦ g−1).
The reverse argument is the same.
2. Let σ′ ∈ ∆(A) and σ ∈ b˜(σ′), so that σi ∈ b˜i(σ′−i) for all i ∈ N . Then σi ◦ g−1 ∈ b˜g.i(σ′−i ◦ g−1) for all
i ∈ N . Therefore σ ◦ g−1 ∈ b˜(σ′ ◦ g−1).
The reverse argument is the same.
3. Let σ ∈ ∆(A) be a Nash equilibrium. Then σ ∈ b˜(σ) giving us σ ◦ g−1 ∈ b˜(σ ◦ g−1). Therefore σ ◦ g−1
is a Nash equilibrium.
The reverse argument is the same.
4. Let σi ∈ ∆(Ai) and si ∈ Ai such that u˜i(σi, σ−i) ≥ u˜i(si, σ−i) for all σ−i ∈ ∆(A−i).
Then v˜g.i((σi, σ−i) ◦ g−1) ≥ v˜g.i((si, σ−i) ◦ g−1) for all σ−i ∈ ∆(A−i). Therefore σ ◦ g−1 strictly
dominates g.s.
The reverse argument is the same.
4.4 Notions of Equivalence
Definition 4.4.1: Let Γ1 and Γ2 be two games.
• Γ1 and Γ2 are strictly equivalent if isom(Γ1,Γ2) is non-empty, which we denote as Γ1 ∼= Γ2,
• Γ1 and Γ2 are ordinally equivalent if isomo(Γ1,Γ2) is non-empty, which we denote as Γ1 ∼=o Γ2, and
• Γ1 and Γ2 are cardinally equivalent if isomc(Γ1,Γ2) is non-empty, which we denote as Γ1 ∼=c Γ2.
Proposition 4.4.2: ∼=, ∼=o and ∼=c are equivalence relations.
Proof. For each game Γ we have idΓ ∈ isom(Γ,Γ), idΓ ∈ isomo(Γ,Γ) and idΓ ∈ isomc(Γ,Γ) which gives
reflexivity of ∼=, ∼=o and ∼=c.
Our symmetric and transitivity conditions follow from games and each type of game isomorphisms being
a groupoid.
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Definition 4.4.3: Let Γ be a game.
• The strict equivalence class of Γ is the set {Γ′ : Γ ∼= Γ′} which we denote as [Γ].
• The ordinal equivalence class of Γ is the set {Γ′ : Γ ∼= Γ′} which we denote as [Γ]o.
• The cardinal equivalence class of Γ is the set {Γ′ : Γ ∼= Γ′} which we denote as [Γ]c.
All games in each equivalence class have the same strategic structure under that notion. We note that
for each set of n player games where each player has di strategies there are an infinite number of strict and
cardinal equivalence classes, and a finite number of ordinal equivalence classes.
Goforth and Robinson [4] counted 144 ordinal equivalence classes for the two player games where each
player has two strategies and their utility function induces a total order over the pure strategy spaces.
We now show that strict equivalence is a weaker notion of equivalence than cardinal equivalence, and
that cardinal equivalence is a weaker notion of equivalnece than ordinal equivalence.
Proposition 4.4.4: isom(Γ1,Γ2) ⊆ isomc(Γ1,Γ2) ⊆ isomo(Γ1,Γ2).
Proof. isom(Γ1,Γ2) ⊆ isomc(Γ1,Γ2) since the idenity function idR is a positive linear transformation and
isomc(Γ1,Γ2) ⊆ isomo(Γ1,Γ2) since every positive linear transformation is a surjective strictly increasing
function.
Of course by transitivity of ⊆ this implies that strict equivalence is also a weaker notion of equivalence
than cardinal equivalence.
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Chapter 5
Symmetric Games
Symmetric games capture the structural notion of a game being fair. Not only is this useful for classifying
games but this structure can also be exploited for computational and theoretical purposes.
In the simplest sense, we would like a symmetric game to represent the same situation regardless of the
player. Under any such definition it is necessary for all players to have the same number of strategies so we
make this assumption for the remainder of the chapter.
5.1 Automorphism Group
Definition 5.1.1: An isomorphism g ∈ isom(Γ,Γ) is an automorphism or symmetry of Γ. We denote the
set of automorphisms as Aut(Γ).
Example 5.1.2: The Prisoner’s Dilemma
d c
d 3, 3 1, 4
c 4, 1 2, 2
Aut(Γ) = {(e; ( d cd c ), ( d cd c )), ((12); ( d cd c ), ( d cd c ))}
Proposition 5.1.3: The automorphisms of a game form a group under composition.
Proof. This follows from the fact that games and strict game isomorphisms are a groupoid.
Remark 5.1.4: Let M be a matching of the strategy sets. For each player permutation pi ∈ SN , M induces
a game bijection (pi; (Mipi(i))i∈N ) ∈ bij(Γ,Γ) which we denote as Mpi.
5.2 Symmetry Groups
Below we define symmetry groups for games which were introduced by Stein et al. [9]. Symmetry groups
make the classification of symmetric games in the next section much clearer.
Definition 5.2.1: A symmetry group of a game Γ is a subgroup G of the automorphism group Aut(Γ).
The stabiliser subgroup for player i is the subgroup of automorphisms {g ∈ G : g.i = i} that map player i
to itself, which we denote as Gi.
Properties 5.2.2: Let G be a symmetry group of a game Γ = (N,A, u). We say that G is;
• player transitive if G acts transitively on N , that is for each i, j ∈ N there exists g ∈ G such that
g.i = j,
• player n-transitive if G acts n-transitively on N , that is for each pi ∈ SN there exists g ∈ G such that
g.i = pi(i) for all i ∈ N , and
• strategy trivial if for each g ∈ Gi, g.si = si for all si ∈ Ai.
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5.3 Notions of Symmetry
In this section we introduce various notions of a game being symmetric. Von Neumann and Morgenstern
[10] were the first to consider symmetric games, which they defined as follows.
Definition 5.3.1: A game Γ is VNM symmetric if Ai = Aj for all i, j ∈ N , and for each permutation
pi ∈ SN , upi(i)(s1, ..., sn) = ui(spi(1), ..., spi(n)) for all i ∈ N and (s1, ..., sn) ∈ A.
Example 5.3.2: Two Player VNM Symmetric Game
a b
a 1, 1 3, 2
b 2, 3 4, 4
For pi =
(
1 2
2 1
) ∈ S2 we have
u1(a, a) = u2(a, a) = 1 u1(a, b) = u2(b, a) = 3
u1(b, a) = u2(a, b) = 2 u1(b, b) = u2(b, b) = 4
While VNM symmetric games are obviously fair, they do not fully capture the notion of fairness, nor do
they classify the possible notions of structural fairness that may be present. We now define the classifications
of symmetric games which we think best capture the possible structural notions of fairness.
Nash [8] provided the most general definition of symmetric game as follows.
Definition 5.3.3: A game Γ is symmetric if its automorphism group is player transitive.
Not only does this drop the requirement that strategy sets be equal, it also drops the assumption that
we are able to match up the strategy sets such that the game be automorphic under the induced game
bijections or that the game be automorphic under every permutation of the players.
Our next notion of a symmetric game was introduced by Stein et al. [9] which strengthens the conditions
for a symmetric game.
Definition 5.3.4: A game Γ is standard symmetric if there exists a player transitive and strategy trivial
symmetry group.
All symmetric games presented so far have been standard symmetric, below we provide an example of a
symmetric game which is not standard symmetric.
Example 5.3.5: Matching Pennies
H T
H 1,−1 −1, 1
T −1, 1 1,−1
Aut(Γ) = {(e; (H TH T ), (H TH T )), (e; (H TT H ), (H TT H )),(
(12);
(
H T
H T
)
,
(
H T
T H
))
,
(
(12);
(
H T
T H
)
,
(
H T
H T
))}
Since Aut(Γ) is player transitive, is not strategy trivial and contains no proper subgroups, matching pennies
is an example of a symmetric game which is not standard symmetric.
We now make another stricter definition of a symmetric game.
Definition 5.3.6: A game Γ is fully symmetric if its automorphism group is player n-transitive.
Finally, we make the following definitions which partition the set of symmetric games up into different
classes based on the kind of structure they contain.
Definition 5.3.7: A game Γ is;
• non-fully non-standard symmetric if it is symmetric but neither fully or standard symmetric,
• fully non-standard symmetric if it is fully symmetric and not standard symmetric,
• non-fully standard symmetric if it is standard symmetric and not fully symmetric, and
• fully standard symmetric if it is fully symmetric and standard symmetric.
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5.4 Properties of Symmetric Games
VNM symmetric games do not have the desirable property that if Γ1 ∼= Γ2 and Γ1 is VNM symmetric then
Γ2 is also VNM symmetric, which we illustrate with the example below.
Example 5.4.1: Consider the two following equivalent games, the first being the prisoners dilemma.
d c
d 3, 3 1, 4
c 4, 1 2, 2
Γ1
∼=
a b
a 1, 4 3, 3
b 2, 2 4, 1
Γ2
Isom(Γ1,Γ2) = {
(
e;
(
d c
a b
)
,
(
d c
b a
))
,
(
(12);
(
d c
b a
)
,
(
d c
a b
))}
Clearly Γ1 is VNM symmetric and Γ1 ∼= Γ2, but Γ2 is not VNM symmetric.
We now show that standard symmetric games capture the notion that the game is symmetric under
some matching of the strategy sets, we note that we use the argument from Stein et al. [9] to show that a
player transitive and strategy trivial symmetry group maps between strategy sets in a canonical manner.
Proposition 5.4.2: A game Γ is standard symmetric if and only if there exists a matching of the strategy
sets such that each game bijection induced from the player permutations in some transitive subgroup of SN
is an automorphism.
Proof. Let Γ be a standard symmetric game, G any player transitive and strategy trivial subgroup of Aut(Γ),
and g, h ∈ G such that g.i = h.i = j.
For each g, h ∈ G such that g.i = h.i = j we have h−1◦g ∈ Gi, strategy triviality of G gives (h−1◦g).si =
si for all si ∈ Ai, so we must have g.si = h.si for all si ∈ Ai. Hence G maps Ai to Aj in a canonical way.
This along with player transitivity of G induces a matching of the strategy sets such that each game
bijection induced from the player bijections in some transitive subgroup of SN is an automorphism.
Conversely, let Γ be a game, H a transitive subgroup of SN and M a matching of the strategy sets such
that each game bijection induced from the player permutations in H is an automorphism.
Then {Mpi ∈ Aut(Γ) : pi ∈ H} is a player transitive and strategy trivial subgroup of Aut(Γ).
Proposition 5.4.3: If Γ is standard symmetric so that there exists a matching M of the strategy sets such
that each game bijection induced from the player permutations in some transitive subgroup H of SN is an
automorphism, then for each i, j ∈ N we have ui(s) = uj(s) for all s ∈M .
Proof. This follows from {Mpi ∈ Aut(Γ) : pi ∈ SN} being a player transitive symmetry group and that
Mpi.s = s for all s ∈M and pi ∈ SN .
This shows that in a standard symmetric game all of the players must assign the same utility to each
strategy profile in some matching of the pure strategy space.
Proposition 5.4.4: If a game has a player n − transitive and strategy trivial symmetry group then it is
fully standard symmetric.
Proof. This follows directly from the definition of fully and standard symmetric games.
It is not entirely clear whether a fully standard symmetric game implies the existence of a player n-
transitive and strategy trivial symmetry group, although it would be desirable if it did for a couple of
reasons discussed below. We have been unable to show this however, so have left it as a conjecture.
Conjecture 5.4.5: A game is fully standard symmetric if and only if it has a player n-transitive and
strategy trivial symmetry group. (Note: conjecture is false, see the more recent paper ‘Notions of Symmetry
for Finite Strategic-Form Games’ by the author).
Suppose this were not the case, then our neat classifications of symmetric games fall to pieces as it is
not intuitively clear by name that a fully symmetric game is not defined as a game which has a player
n-transitive and strategy trivial symmetry group.
The lack of the desirable property for VNM symmetric games outlined above is a result of the definition
implicitly imposing an order on each player’s strategy set. We now look at where VNM symmetric games
lie with respect to our other classifications of symmetric games.
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Proposition 5.4.6: A game is VNM symmetric if and only if for each player permutation pi ∈ SN we have
ui(s1, ..., sn) = upi(i)(spi−1(1), ..., spi−1(n)) for all i ∈ N and (s1, ..., sn) ∈ A.
Proof. Let Γ be a VNM symmetric game, and let i ∈ N and (s1, ..., sn) ∈ A. It follows that upi(i)(s1, ..., sn) =
ui(spi(1), ..., spi(n)) for all pi ∈ SN . Therefore ui(s1, ..., sn) = upi−1(i)(spi(1), ..., spi(n)) for all pi ∈ SN . Subbing in
pi = pi−1 we have ui(s1, ..., sn) = upi(i)(spi−1(1), ..., spi−1(n)) for all pi ∈ SN .
The converse is the same in reverse.
Proposition 5.4.7: If a game is VNM symmetric then it has a player n-transitive and strategy trivial
symmetry group.
Proof. Let Γ be a VNM symmetric game, j ∈ N and M = {(sj , ..., sj) : sj ∈ Aj}. Then for each pi ∈ SN we
have, ui(s) = ui(s1, ..., sn) = upi(i)(spi−1(1), ..., spi−1(n)) = uMpi .i(Mpi.s) for all s ∈ A.
Therefore {Mpi ∈ Aut(Γ) : pi ∈ SN} is a player n-transitive and strategy trivial symmetry group.
Proposition 5.4.8: If a game has a player n-transitive and strategy trivial symmetry group then it is
isomorphic to a VNM symmetric game.
Proof. If Γ is a game with a player n-transitive and strategy trivial symmetry group G then there exists a
matching of the strategy sets M such that G = {Mpi : pi ∈ SN}. If we relabel the elements of each n-tuple
in M as the same then the resulting game is VNM symmetric.
This shows that VNM symmetric games have the same structure as those with a player n-transitive and
strategy trivial symmetry group. If our above conjecture is true then VNM symmetric games have the same
structure as fully standard symmetric games.
A game with a player n-transitive and strategy trivial symmetry group has the additional property that
each player is playing each of their opponents symmetrically regardless of how all other opponents play.
This means these games are fair regardless of the skill for each player.
5.5 Classifying a Game
While the notions of symmetric, standard symmetric and fully symmetric games give us various descriptive
definitions of strategic fairness, they do not provide a constructive way to determine where a particular
game lies in these classifications. Below we provide an overview of some ways to classify a given game.
For a game to be fully symmetric it is necessary that there exist an automorphism for every player
permutation. Therefore, to show that a game is not fully symmetric we need to show there does not exist
an automorphism for some player permutation, and to show that a game is fully symmetric we need to show
there exists an automorphism for each player permutation in some generating set of the player permutations.
Since S2 is its only transitive subgroup, it follows that a two player game is symmetric if and only if
it is fully symmetric. Therefore to show whether or not a two player game is symmetric we can just show
whether or not it is fully symmetric.
Since < (123) > is the least transitive subgroup of S3 when ordered by ⊆, for a three player game to be
symmetric it is necessary that there exist an automorphism for each 3-cycle player permutation. Therefore,
to show that a three player game is not symmetric we need to show there does not exist an automorphism
for some 3-cycle player permutation, and to show that a three player game is symmetric we need to show
there exists an automorphism for a 3-cycle player permutation.
In general it is a little more difficult to show whether or not a game is symmetric. To show that a game is
symmetric we need to show there exists an automorphism for every player permutation in some generating
set of some transitive subgroup of the player permutations, and to show that a game is not symmetric
we must either find Aut(Γ) and show that it is not player transitive or show that there does not exist an
automorphism for some player permutation in each generating set of every transitive subgroup of the player
permutations.
We note that every n-cycle generates a transitive subgroup of Sn but not all subgroups of Sn contain an
n-cycle for n ≥ 4. For example, {e, (12) ◦ (34), (13) ◦ (24), (14) ◦ (23)} is a transitive subgroup of S4 which
does not contain a 4-cycle.
To show that a game is standard symmetric we need to find a matching of the strategy sets such that
each player permutation in a transitive subgroup H ⊆ SN is an automorphism. If there does not exist di
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pure strategies such that each player plays each of their own pure strategies in exactly one strategy and
the utilities are all equal for each of these strategies, then we can conclude that the game is not standard
symmetric.
5.6 Constructing Symmetric Games
We can construct a symmetric game by picking out game bijections that generate a player transitive subgroup
G of the bijections and for each g ∈ G setting ui(s) = ug.i(g.s) for all i ∈ N and s ∈ A.
Example 5.6.1: If we take the following as our subgroup of bijections.
G = {(e; ( a ba b ), ( c dc d )), ((12); ( a bc d ), ( c da b ))}
Then
(
(12);
(
d c
b a
)
,
(
d c
a b
)) ∈ G requires that we have,
u1(a, c) = u2(a, c) = α u1(a, d) = u2(b, c) = γ
u1(b, c) = u2(a, d) = β u1(b, d) = u2(b, d) = δ
Which results in the game given below.
c d
a α, α γ, β
b β, γ δ, δ
All 2× 2 standard symmetric games are isomorphic to a game of this form, hence this essentially gives
us a general form for the 2 × 2 standard symmetric games. We can pick out a particular 2 × 2 standard
symmetric game by assigning values to α, β, γ and δ.
To construct a game which is or is not fully symmetric we just need to choose bijections such that the
subgroup they generate is or is not player n-transitive.
To construct a standard symmetric game we can pick out a matching of the strategy sets and player
permutations in a transitive subgroup of Sn, then the game constructed from the induced game bijections
is standard symmetric. Constructing a non-standard symmetric game is not so simple, we must actually
construct the game and check that it is non-standard symmetric.
5.7 Examples of Symmetric Games
Below we provide some less trivial examples in each class of symmetric games which were generated using
the construction method outlined in the last section.
Example 5.7.1: Fully standard symmetric three player game
c d
a 1, 1, 1 6, 2, 6
b 2, 6, 6 5, 5, 3
e
c d
a 6, 6, 2 3, 5, 5
b 5, 3, 5 4, 4, 4
f
If we take the matching {(a, c, e), (b, d, f)} of the strategy sets then the induced bijection for each player
permutation is an automorphism. The set of these automorphisms forms a player transitive and strategy
trivial symmetry group making it a fully standard symmetric game.
Example 5.7.2: Non-fully standard symmetric three player game.
c d
a 1, 1, 1 3, 5, 7
b 5, 7, 3 2, 4, 6
e
c d
a 7, 3, 5 6, 2, 4
b 4, 6, 2 8, 8, 8
f
Aut(Γ) = {(e; ( a ba b ),( c dc d ), ( e fe f )), ((123); ( a bc d ), ( c de f ), ( e fa b )),(
(321);
(
a b
e f
)
,
(
c d
a b
)
,
(
e f
c d
))
, }
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Clearly Aut(Γ) is player transitive and strategy trivial making Γ standard symmetric. Additionally,
since there does not exist an automorphism for every permutation of the players, Γ is non-fully standard
symmetric.
Example 5.7.3: Two non-fully non-standard symmetric four player games. The second is an example of a
symmetric four player game which does not have an automorphism for each 4-cycle player permutation.
c d
a 1, 2, 3, 4 4, 1, 3, 2
b 2, 3, 4, 1 5, 6, 7, 8
(e, g)
c d
a 8, 5, 6, 7 3, 4, 1, 2
b 7, 8, 5, 6 6, 7, 8, 5
(f, g)
c d
a 6, 7, 8, 5 7, 8, 5, 6
b 3, 4, 1, 2 8, 5, 6, 7
(e, h)
c d
a 5, 6, 7, 8 2, 3, 4, 1
b 4, 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3, 4
(f, h)
Aut(Γ) =<
(
(1234);
(
a b
d c
)
,
(
c d
e f
)
,
( e f
g h
)
,
(
g h
a b
))
>
c d
a 1, 1, 2, 2 3, 4, 4, 3
b 4, 3, 3, 4 2, 2, 1, 1
(e, g)
c d
a 4, 3, 3, 4 2, 2, 1, 1
b 1, 1, 2, 2 3, 4, 4, 3
(f, g)
c d
a 3, 4, 4, 3 1, 1, 2, 2
b 2, 2, 1, 1 4, 3, 3, 4
(e, h)
c d
a 2, 2, 1, 1 4, 3, 3, 4
b 3, 4, 4, 3 1, 1, 2, 2
(f, h)
Aut(Γ) =<
(
(12)(34);
(
a b
d c
)
,
(
c d
a b
)
,
(
e f
h g
)
,
(
g h
e f
))
,(
(13)(24);
(
a b
f e
)
,
(
c d
h g
)
,
(
e f
a b
)
,
(
g h
c d
))
,
(
(14)(23);
(
a b
h g
)
,
(
c d
f e
)
,
(
e f
c d
)
,
(
g h
a b
))
>
Clearly the game bijections generate games which are symmetric and not fully symmetric. Additionally,
since there exist no strategy profiles such that the players’ utility values are equal, the games are not standard
symmetric. Hence, both games are non-fully non-standard symmetric.
Example 5.7.4: Fully non-standard symmetric four player game.
c d
a 2, 1, 1, 1 1, 1, 2, 1
b 2, 1, 1, 1 1, 1, 1, 2
(e, g)
c d
a 1, 1, 1, 2 1, 1, 2, 1
b 1, 2, 1, 1 1, 2, 1, 1
(f, g)
c d
a 1, 2, 1, 1 1, 2, 1, 1
b 1, 1, 2, 1 1, 1, 1, 2
(e, h)
c d
a 1, 1, 1, 2 2, 1, 1, 1
b 1, 1, 2, 1 2, 1, 1, 1
(f, h)
Aut(Γ) =<
(
(1234);
(
a b
c d
)
,
(
c d
e f
)
,
( e f
h g
)
,
(
g h
a b
))
,
(
(12);
(
a b
c d
)
,
(
c d
a b
)
,
( e f
e f
)
,
( g h
h g
))
>
Clearly the game bijections generate a fully symmetric game, and since there exist no strategy profiles
such that the players’ utility values are equal the game is not standard symmetric.
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5.8 Incorrect Symmetric Game Classification
Dasgupta and Maskin [2] gave an incorrect definition of a symmetric game which we give below.
Definition 5.8.1: A game Γ is DM symmetric if Ai = Aj for all i, j ∈ N , and for each player permutation
pi ∈ SN , ui(s1, ..., sn) = upi(i)(spi(1), ..., spi(n)) for all i ∈ N and (s1, ..., sn) ∈ A.
The problem with this definition is that it does not correctly permute the players and their strategies,
for example for each player i, the right hand side does not have player pi(i) playing the strategy that player
i played.
Proposition 5.8.2: A game is VNM symmetric if and only if for each player transposition pi ∈ SN ,
ui(s1, ..., sn) = upi(i)(spi(1), ..., spi(n)) for all i ∈ N and (s1, ..., sn) ∈ A.
Proof. Let Γ be a VNM symmetric game and let pi ∈ SN be a transposition. Then we have ui(s1, ..., sn) =
upi(i)(spi−1(1), ..., spi−1(n)) for all i ∈ N and (s1, ..., sn) ∈ A. Therefore since pi = pi−1 we have ui(s1, ..., sn) =
upi(i)(spi(1), ..., spi(n)) for all i ∈ N and (s1, ..., sn) ∈ A.
The converse is much the same except we note that the condition for a DM symmetric game is met for
all player transpositions since it is met for all player permutations.
This shows that if a game is DM symmetric then it is VNM symmetric. Furthermore, since each element
of S2 is its own inverse, it follows that the two notions are equivalent for two player games.
Below we give an example of a three player VNM symmetric game which is not DM symmetric to show
that the classifications are not equivalent for games with at least three players.
Example 5.8.3: Three Player Symmetric Game
a b
a 1, 1, 1 2, 3, 2
b 3, 2, 2 4, 4, 5
a
a b
a 2, 2, 3 5, 4, 4
b 4, 5, 4 6, 6, 6
b
If we take pi =
(
1 2 3
2 3 1
) ∈ S3 and s = (b, a, a) ∈ A, we see that
3 = u1(b, a, a) = u1(s1, s2, s3)
6= upi(1)(spi(1), spi(2), spi(3)) = u2(s2, s3, s1) = u2(a, a, b) = 2
It should be fairly obvious that if we are mapping player 1 to player 2 and player 1 is playing b then we
want the mapped strategy to have player 2 playing b, but this is not what is required for a DM symmetric
game.
We could restrict the condition for a DM symmetric game to just player transpositions, however trans-
positions are not closed under composition so the composition of automorphisms would not necessarily meet
this condition, making it fairly undesirable.
5.9 Equilibria in Symmetric Games
We now present two famous theorems without proof relating to the existence of Nash equilibria in symmetric
games. Our first result from Nash [8] gives the existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 5.9.1: Every symmetric game has a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Our second result by Cheng et al. [1] gives the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for fully
standard symmetric 2× ...× 2 games.
Theorem 5.9.2: Every fully standard symmetric 2× ...× 2 game has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Cheng et al. [1] noted that rock, paper, scissors is an example of a fully standard symmetric 3 × 3
game with no pure strategy Nash equilibria, and indirectly that matching pennies is an example of a fully
non-standard symmetric 2× 2 game with no pure strategy Nash equilibria.
Example 5.9.3: Rock, paper, scissors.
R P S
R 0, 0 0, 1 1, 0
P 1, 0 0, 0 0, 1
S 0, 1 1, 0 0, 0
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However they only considered fully standard symmetric games as symmetric, consequently not consid-
ering whether the result might hold for non-fully standard symmetric games. We provide an example below
to show that this is not the case.
Example 5.9.4: A non-fully standard symmetric 2× 2× 2 game with no pure strategy Nash equilibria.
c d
a 2, 2, 2 6, 4, 5
b 4, 5, 6 8, 1, 7
e
c d
a 5, 6, 4 7, 8, 1
b 1, 7, 8 3, 3, 3
f
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